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ENCOURAGING LITIGATION: WHY
DODD-FRANK GOES TOO FAR IN
ELIMINATING THE PROCEDURAL
DIFFICULTIES IN SARBANES-OXLEY
Jessica Luhrs*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, widely touted as “the Great
Recession,”1 the government and public have struggled to identify a proper
solution in order to prevent another catastrophic hit to the national
economy. One of the most difficult aspects of this endeavor has been
understanding the sophisticated and exotic investment schemes that
contributed to this crisis. Investment products such as credit default swaps,
collateralized debt obligations, and other derivatives were poorly
understood and, despite their exponential growth in the years leading up to
the crisis, were poorly regulated.2 As such, a national financial crisis
spanned borders, highlighting the weakness of an interconnected global
economy composed of financial instruments beyond the understanding of
many investors and regulators.
The Dodd-Frank Act is a recent response to this crisis. The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010, institutes many
changes to the way the Securities and Exchange Commission (“the SEC”)
regulates the banking and financial services industries.3 The legislation
creates a council of regulators to monitor economic risks, creates a new

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Finding a Cure: Post-Crisis Regulation
of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1300 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Keir D. Gumbs, Covington Burlington, LLP Client Advisory: Dodd Frank Beefs Up SEC and
CFTC Enforcement, 1855 PLI/Corp 413, 415 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No.
27014, 2010).
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agency to regulate consumer financial products, and sets new standards for
Further, Dodd-Frank includes whistle-blower
trading derivatives.4
protections, shareholder approvals of golden parachute payments and sayon-pay votes, disclosures of hedging and leadership structures, and
Proponents of Dodd-Frank
compensation disclosure requirements.5
promise that it will reduce the chances of another crisis and allow
regulators to better handle one, should it arrive.6 They further tout its
capacity to restore investor confidence, protect consumers and encourage
economic growth.7 In contrast, opponents lament that Dodd-Frank “is a
2,300-page legislative monster . . . that expands the scope and the powers
of ineffective bureaucracies.”8
Whatever the public’s estimation of Dodd-Frank as a whole, one
section in particular is the subject of hot debate. The sweeping whistleblower protections included in Dodd-Frank have garnered significant
attention, particularly because they dramatically decrease the barriers and
increase the incentives for corporate whistle-blowers.9 Specifically, DoddFrank amends many provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to broaden both
the class of individuals who may be considered whistle-blowers, as well as
to include more employers and additional causes of action. While many
critics of Sarbanes-Oxley argue that it did not go far enough in protecting
whistle-blowers, this article argues that Dodd-Frank has gone too far in
eliminating the procedural difficulties in Sarbanes-Oxley by drastically
lowering the obstacles to filing claims, without providing safeguards
against the inevitable onslaught of meritless or fraudulent claims.
Furthermore, Dodd-Frank disincentivizes transparency as a means of selfregulation, thus placing even more responsibility for regulating financial
markets in the hands of a resource-strapped agency that may not be
equipped to identify, understand and address problems in a timely manner.
The first part of this article will identify the specific whistle-blower
protections included in Dodd-Frank, followed by a comparison to previous
rules under Sarbanes-Oxley, and conclude that Dodd-Frank skews the
incentive structure such that the SEC will surely face an onslaught of false
or meritless claims. Next, self-regulation as an effective means of market
regulation along with government oversight will be discussed. This
discussion will highlight another shortcoming of Dodd-Frank, insofar as it
4. Damian Palette & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Political Landscape, WALL ST. J., July
16, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487046826045753690300
61839958.html.
5. Ryan J. Maierson, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: The General
Counsel’s Quick Reference Guide, 1855 PLI/Corp 371, 374 (PLI Corp Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 27014, 2010).
6. Palette & Lucchetti, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Shelby (R., Ala.)).
9. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374–75.
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discourages market transparency as a means of market regulation. Finally,
solutions to the problems inherent in Dodd-Frank will be offered, including
repairing the whistle-blower incentive structure, encouraging transparency
and internal corporate whistle-blower processes, and publicly prosecuting
false claims to establish a clear no-tolerance policy.
II. EXPANDED WHISTLE-BLOWER PROTECTIONS
UNDER DODD-FRANK
As defined in Dodd-Frank, a whistle-blower includes any person or
group providing any information that relates to any violation of securities
law.10 Specifically, whistle-blowers may provide information pertaining to
a violation of any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
criminal retaliation and violation of any other law, rule or regulation that is
within the jurisdiction of the SEC.11 In addition, whistle-blowers may
provide the SEC with reports of financial fraud by employees of a covered
employer.12
The class of whistle-blowers entitled to an award does not include
employees of certain governmental or regulatory agencies, or those who
were employed by such agencies when they obtained the information
leading to their claims.13 In addition, employees convicted of a criminal
violation related to the activities giving rise to their whistle-blowing claim
are excluded, as are those who obtained the information giving rise to their
claim in the course of an audit required under securities law and who could
not lawfully submit information under § 10A of the Securities Exchange
Act.14 Finally, those who knowingly provide false information may not
receive an award.15 These exclusions are narrow, however, and therefore
one commentator has noted that “even an attorney who discloses the
information in violation of the attorney/client privilege seems to be eligible
to receive a bounty (unless such attorney can somehow be criminally
convicted for this impropriety).”16
Importantly, whistle-blowers must provide “original information” not
known to the SEC, and not “exclusively derived” from an allegation made
in an official hearing, government report, audit, investigation, or from the

10. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Esta E. Stecher, Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower Provisions: Dodd-Frank Act Contains Several
New and Expanded Whistleblower Provisions, Including Mandatory Rewards, Publications, 1849
PLI/Corp 861, 864 (PLI Corp Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 24008, 2010).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. John C. Coffee, Jr., New York Law Journal—Hidden Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act, 1849
PLI/Corp 871, 874 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 24008, 2010).
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media.17 Increasing the scope of Dodd-Frank, information supplied by a
whistle-blower may be related to securities violations that occurred either
before or after the passage of Dodd-Frank.18 Where the information
provided by a whistle-blower is insufficient to lead to “successful
enforcement” of an action, however, the SEC may refuse to pay out a
bounty.19 If the SEC makes a minimal award or no award at all, the
whistle-blower may appeal the SEC’s decision to a court of appeals.20
Retaliation against a whistle-blower is explicitly forbidden in DoddFrank.21 Employers may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
[or otherwise] discriminate against the whistle-blower in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower” in providing the SEC with information, or initiating or testifying in
an SEC investigation or judicial administrative action based upon this
information, or for making disclosures protected under Sarbanes-Oxley.22
Whistle-blowers alleging retaliation may sue in federal district court,
and relief may include reinstatement of prior seniority, double back pay
with interest, and compensation for litigation costs including expert
witnesses and reasonable attorneys’ fees.23 Notably, the burden of proof
for whistle-blowers alleging a prima facie case of retaliation is significantly
lower under Dodd-Frank than under other federal anti-retaliation statutes.24
Whereas in other federal laws employees must show that the protected
conduct—that is, the conduct they allege served as a basis for their
employer’s retaliation—was a determining or significant factor in the
retaliation, under Dodd-Frank employees need only show that the protected
conduct was a contributing factor.25 To defeat this claim, an employer
must then provide clear and convincing evidence that they would have
taken the same action were it not for the employee’s protected conduct.26
Claims of retaliation must be brought within six years after the
retaliation, or within three years after facts material to the right of action
were or should have been discovered, but in any case within ten years after
the retaliation.27 Sarbanes-Oxley claims must be brought within 180 days
17. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-203, §
922, 124 Stat 1376, 1841–42 (2010).
18. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374–75.
19. Coffee, supra note 16, at 875.
20. Id. (noting that this ability to appeal could result in the SEC’s litigation docket containing a
new class of bounty denials and appeals cases).
21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §748.
22. Id.
23. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374–75; Miranda Tolar, Whistleblowers in the Corporate Context:
And Employer’s Perspective, ASPATORE, Nov. 2010, at *4, available at 2010 WL 4774893.
24. Expansion of Whistleblower Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act, COOLEY LLP (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.cooley.com/expansion-of-whistleblower-protection-the-dodd-frank-act.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §922.
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of the date on which the violation occurred, or the date when the whistleblower learned of the action.28
Dodd-Frank amends the Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to provide a mandatory reward for those whistleblowers that bring original information and meet the other requirements as
set forth in Dodd-Frank.29 Whistle-blowers may recover an amount
between ten percent and thirty percent of the total monetary sanctions
imposed under Dodd-Frank.30 When determining the amount of an award,
the SEC may consider the significance of the information provided by the
whistle-blower, the degree of assistance by the whistle-blower and his or
her legal representative, and the interests of the SEC in deterrence by
making an award to the whistle-blower.31 However, a whistle-blower must
reveal his or her identity in order to collect the award.32
Dodd-Frank provides funding for whistle-blower awards by
establishing a Securities and Exchange Commission Investor Protection
Fund and a Commodity Futures Trading Commission Customer Protection
Fund in the U.S. Treasury.33 These funds will be partially funded by some
of the monetary penalties brought under the securities laws.34
III. A DEPARTURE FROM SARBANES-OXLEY
Prior to Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley set forth the rules for reporting
information regarding financial fraud, including protections for whistleblowers. Passed in 2002 in reaction to the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
Sarbanes-Oxley set forth unprecedented anti-retaliation protections for
whistle-blowers and was lauded as one of the “most protective antiretaliation provisions in the world.”35 Despite its celebrated passage,
however, in the first three years only 3.6% of whistle-blowers were
successful in their claims under the act, and on appeal, only 6.5% of
whistle-blowers were successful.36 Scholars have attributed this low
success rate in part to a strict application of procedural and statutory
requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley that resulted in most cases failing to

28. Esta E. Stecher, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP—Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower Provisions: DoddFrank Act Contains Several New and Expanded Whistleblower Provisions, Including Mandatory
Rewards, Publications, 1849 PLI/Corp 861, 865 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No.
24008, 2010).
29. Stecher, supra note 28, at 864.
30. Maierson, supra note 9, at 374.
31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §922.
32. Maierson, supra note 9, at 375.
33. Stecher, supra note 28, at 864.
34. Id.
35. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 65 (2007).
36. Moberly, supra note 35, at 65.
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meet the legal standards of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim and thus never reaching
a determination of the facts on the merits.37 Indeed, 66.7% of cases brought
to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) were
rejected, and 95.2% of the cases appealed to administrative law judges
were rejected.38 Some of these procedural and statutory requirements are
discussed below.
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, whistle-blowers included only those
employees providing information regarding financial fraud.39 In these
cases, whistle-blowers reported violations to the OSHA, and Department of
Labor processes were used in retaliation cases.40
Whistle-blowers could only bring retaliation claims against publicly
traded companies. In order to bring a successful suit, whistle-blowers
working for private subsidiaries of public companies had to prove that the
subsidiary was either an alter ego of the publicly traded parent company, or
an agent of that company.41
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, whistle-blowers alleging retaliation first filed
complaints with OSHA, which then conducted an investigation and issued
preliminary orders.42 A complaint was required to be filed with OSHA
within ninety days of the date on which the violation occurred.43 Not
surprisingly, this short filing requirement eliminated many whistle-blower
claims; according to one study, in 2006, fifteen percent of the SarbanesOxley whistle-blower claims were dismissed for failure to file a timely
claim.44 Another scholar suggests that the failure rate for claims brought to
the OSHA based solely on the statute of limitations was eighteen percent,
and as high as one-third for cases brought to administrative law judges.45
In the event that either party objected to the results of the OSHA
investigation and orders, an administrative judge within the Department of
Labor conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued an appealable
decision.46 In the case of an appeal to the Department of Labor’s
Administrative Review Board, if the board failed to issue a final decision
within 180 days of filing the complaint, the whistle-blower could bring an
action in federal court, where it would be reviewed de novo.47
The Dodd-Frank amendments mark a significant departure from the

37. Moberly, supra note 35, at 71.
38. Id.
39. Maierson, supra note 9, at 374.
40. Id.
41. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2.
42. Id.
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010).
44. Jisoo Kim, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower Provision
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 241, 251 (2009).
45. Moberly, supra note 35, at 72.
46. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2.
47. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2.
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original Sarbanes-Oxley rules in several respects. First, unlike SarbanesOxley, Dodd-Frank covers both public companies and subsidiaries or
affiliates whose financial information is included in its financial
statements.48 This effectively encompasses most subsidiaries and affiliates
of public companies.49 Dodd-Frank also protects employees of nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations.50
Second, while it was unclear whether Sarbanes-Oxley suits in federal
court were entitled to a jury, under Dodd-Frank, litigants have the express
right to a jury trial.51 This is particularly significant because juries are often
skeptical about employers in whistle-blower cases, and because these suits
often involve complicated financial transactions that may be difficult to
explain to a jury.52 Therefore the right to a jury trial will likely prove
advantageous to whistle-blowers under Dodd-Frank.
Third, Dodd-Frank likely renders arbitration agreements of SarbanesOxley claims unenforceable. Specifically, Dodd-Frank states that “[n]o
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the
agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”53 In
addition, Dodd-Frank most likely nullifies any post-termination waivers of
Sarbanes-Oxley claims.54 This means that if an employee signed an
agreement not to file a Sarbanes-Oxley claim upon termination of
employment, that agreement will not be enforced.
Finally, whistle-blowers who win retaliation claims are entitled to
double back pay with interest under Dodd-Frank, as opposed to merely
back pay under Sarbanes-Oxley.55 Dodd-Frank also explicitly provides for
reinstatement with seniority,56 whereas under Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers were not always reinstated even after a court order.57 In fact, the
Second Circuit ruled that courts lacked jurisdiction to enforce preliminary
orders of reinstatement under Sarbanes-Oxley.58 Thus, employees who
were formerly only entitled to back pay after wrongful termination under
Sarbanes-Oxley may now receive double back pay as well as reinstatement
to their previous position of seniority under Dodd-Frank.

48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §929A.
49. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2.
50. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(b).
51. Id.
52. Tolar, supra note 23, at 13.
53. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(c).
54. Tolar, supra note 23, at 3.
55. Id. at 4.
56. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(a).
57. Jisoo Kim, Comment, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need To Reform the Whistleblower
Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 242–43; 254–55; 259; 262–63
(2009).
58. Kim, supra note 57, at 262.

LUHRS-DODD FRANK-10-12-11.JJO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

182

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

10/30/2011 3:53 PM

Vol. 8:1

IV. AN INVITATION TO FILE FALSE AND MERITLESS CLAIMS
The myriad of expanded provisions under Dodd-Frank create a
skewed incentive system for whistle-blowers. Barriers to filing claims
have been drastically reduced. The statute of limitations has been extended
from a mere ninety days under Sarbanes-Oxley to 180 days,59 or in the case
of retaliation, between three and six years for employers protected by the
SEA under Dodd-Frank.60 The class of whistle-blowers has been
expanded, as have the types of companies within the scope of Dodd-Frank.
Now, nearly any whistle-blower reporting any securities violation61 against
a broad range of public or private companies62 will be covered by DoddFrank. Additionally, the burden of proof has been lowered for establishing
a prima facie case of retaliation. Employees now need only show that the
protected action was a contributing factor, rather than a determining or
significant, factor, leading to the unfavorable personnel action giving rise
to their claim.63 Combined, these new rules reduce the likelihood that a
whistle-blower’s claim will be thrown out for failure to comply with the
statutory formalities of Dodd-Frank. Employees are more likely to fall
within the temporal statutory formalities with the longer statute of
limitations. Employees are also more likely to have the requisite amount of
proof in any retaliation complaints under Dodd-Frank because they no
longer need to show anything near causation. Furthermore, for employers
to defeat such retaliation claims, they must provide clear and convincing
evidence that they would have acted the same way towards the employee in
the absence of the protected conduct.64 This provides additional protection
for whistle-blowers because the clear and convincing standard is higher
than the previous requirement of merely articulating a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for conducting the personnel action.65
After whistle-blower claims survive the more lenient procedural and
statutory requirements of Dodd-Frank, they are also likely to face more
favorable treatment in trial. Under Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley claims are
now entitled to jury trials in federal court with large monetary awards at
stake, thus increasing the likelihood that whistle-blowers who might not
otherwise be able to afford counsel will be able to obtain an attorney on a
contingent fee basis to aggressively litigate their claims.66 Indeed,
59. Stecher, supra note 13, at 866.
60. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922. See also 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010).
61. Maierson, supra note 5, at 373.
62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(a).
63. See Expansion of Whistleblower Protection, supra note 24.
64. Id.
65. See Expansion of Whistleblower Protection, supra note 24.
66. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922; 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(b)(2)(E).
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commentators have predicted that more plaintiffs’ attorneys will enter the
field, drawn by the potentially staggering cash bounties.67 They may even
begin soliciting whistle-blowers who otherwise might not have considered
filing a claim.68 Further, contingency fee agreements might face lax
regulation; firms could enter into a one-third contingency agreement with a
would-be whistle-blower, and unlike fee awards in class action cases,
judicial approval is not required for this fee.69
Jury trials are also likely to lead to more favorable results for whistleblowers, as juries are generally suspicious of employers in whistle-blower
cases.70 This combination of competent legal counsel and sympathetic
juries is likely to result in a significant increase in the number of successful
whistle-blower claims, particularly when compared to the low success rate
of Sarbanes-Oxley claims.71
On the other hand, Dodd-Frank provides strong incentives to bypass
internal corporate regulatory measures and instead engage in a profitseeking race. Successful whistle-blowers are entitled to a large chunk of
the penalty levied against an employer, between ten percent and thirty
percent.72 Legal commentators have opined that this payout is “too
much.”73 Indeed, given that SEC actions sometimes settle for between
$100 million and $800 million, and that corporate defendants often settle
with the SEC, even ten percent of the penalty is extraordinarily large.74
Because whistle-blowers must provide original information not previously
reported to the SEC, they are likely to rush to the SEC before utilizing
internal corporate remedies in order to ensure that they are the first to
provide the information.75 If employees brought their concerns to internal
counsel before the SEC, they would run the risk that their employers would
report the claims to the SEC first, to ensure that the employee could not
provide original information to the SEC.
The assistance of counsel may help weed out some meritless claims,
but this incentive structure nonetheless provides little penalty for filing a
weak claim on the off chance that it is successful. Attorneys are likely to
build stronger cases by supplementing the whistle-blower’s testimony with
other evidence.76 The SEC, an already resource-strapped agency,77 is thus

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Coffee, supra note 16, at 874.
Id.
Id. at 874.
See Tolar, supra note 23, at 13.
Moberly, supra note 35, at 94–95.
Maierson, supra note 5, at 374.
Christopher Wiener, Blowing the Whistle on Van Asdale: Analysis and Recommendations, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 531, 556 (2010).
74. Coffee, supra note 16, at 873.
75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922.
76. Coffee, supra note 16, at 874.
77. Jim Puzzanghera, SEC Chief Warns Against Budget Cuts, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011,

LUHRS-DODD FRANK-10-12-11.JJO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

184

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

10/30/2011 3:53 PM

Vol. 8:1

setting itself up to be inundated with both false and meritless claims
brought by whistle-blowers seeking little more than a huge monetary
payout. While Dodd-Frank includes an allocation of penalty fines to
finance the prosecution of cases and payouts to whistle-blowers, it is
unclear how it will be able to efficiently resolve a substantial number of
cases if much of its time is wasted on empty claims.
These factors add up to create a strong incentive for whistle-blowers
to attempt to file weak and meritless claims. Dodd-Frank cautions that
whistle-blowers bringing false claims will not be entitled to a monetary
award, but does not contain express language outlining a penalty for
bringing such a claim.78 As a result, plaintiff’s law firms have been
inundated with calls from would-be whistle-blowers eager to bring a claim
and collect a bounty award, a trend that seems likely to continue.79
Certainly law firms that accept cases on a contingent fee basis will weed
out some weak claims, but it is likely that a large number of claims will
still reach the SEC.
V. MARKET SELF-REGULATION AS A SUPPLEMENT TO
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
Many of the inherent problems in Dodd-Frank’s whistle-blower
protections could be eliminated by scaling back the incentives for whistleblowers and instead providing strong market incentives for self-regulation
as a supplement to government oversight.
While Dodd-Frank creates a strong incentive for whistle-blowers to
report perceived violations as quickly as possible, some critics argue that it
still falls short of the inherent benefits of self-regulation, as opposed to
direct government regulation under Dodd-Frank. This is because, unlike
the SEC, the financial industry can access, asses and react to market
information quickly. Particularly in complex financial markets, the ability
to react to problems immediately is crucial, as opposed to waiting for a
drawn-out SEC investigation.80 By discouraging whistle-blowers from
alerting their employers to potential problems first, Dodd-Frank essentially
ensures that problems will not be addressed immediately. Further, some
commentators suggest that direct government regulation of the financial
sector is inefficient because it incorrectly allocates risk and, as a result, the

available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/05/business/la-fi-sec-schapiro-20110205.
78. Stecher, supra note 13, at 864 (2010).
79. Maxwell Kennerly, The Idiot’s Guide Whistleblowing Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform Act, LITIGATION & TRIAL-THE LAW BLOG OF PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY MAX KENNERLY (Sept.
10,
2010),
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2010/09/articles/the-law/for-people/the-idiots-guidewhistleblowing-under-the-doddfrank-wall-street-reform-act/.
80. Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 670 (2010).
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cost of capital increases.81 In this vein, it is argued that market forces alone
can incentivize financial firms to act with “due diligence,” so long as those
markets are efficient and transparent.82 Certainly self-regulation of
financial markets has been problematic in recent years, but this does not
mean that the concept cannot be applied in new ways.
History has shown that market self-regulation can be extremely
effective, and also that pure government oversight is rife with problems.
Indeed, in so called “top-down, centralized” regulatory regimes, critics
argue that the government has insufficient knowledge to identify root
causes of problems, design solutions, implement rules, and motivate
regulated industries to comply with rules.83 In this vein, the centralized
SEC regulatory body under Dodd-Frank could have inherent problems by
nature of being a “top-down” government regulatory body.
Proponents of self-regulation also tout its potential to create a sense of
ownership and participation in rule making, as well as to foster shared
values and encourage voluntary compliance with rules made in accord with
these values.84 When private industry is involved in rule making, it
becomes a compromise that recognizes the unique circumstances facing
each industry. While, as skeptics are quick to point out, self-regulation can
lead to collective action problems and even self-serving, illusory
regulation,85 these characterizations ignore the potential for efficient,
effective regulation by pairing self-regulation with government oversight.
One example of effective self-regulation of markets is the disclosurebased regulatory system found in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, passed
by Congress in the wake of the Great Depression in order to regulate Wall
Street.86 Mandatory disclosures and antifraud measures, such as § 10(b),
were principle among the regulations in this act.87 Subsequent judicial
interpretation of § 10(b) both narrowed the range of activities that fall
within the scope of the regulatory power of that act and set a high burden of
proof for private plaintiffs bringing claims under § 10(b).88 This narrow
interpretation of § 10(b) reflects a disclosure-based regulatory system, the
favored regulatory policy of the past several decades.89 The theory behind
a disclosure-based system is that when investors have sufficient
information about the firms in which they invest, they make rational
81. Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, The Market for Securities and its Regulation Through Gatekeepers,
23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 317, 321 (2009).
82. Id.
83. Omarova, supra note 80, at 672.
84. Id. at 671.
85. Id. at 672.
86. See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 65 (2009).
87. See Colombo, supra note 86, at 65.
88. See id. at 67.
89. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2007).
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choices and markets function efficiently.90 This policy gives deference to
individual choice and reduces government interference, suggesting that the
best way to ensure that markets perform efficiently is to require firms to
disclose financial data, not by encouraging an onslaught of private
litigation by setting a low burden of proof for § 10(b) claims.91 In this way,
markets self-regulate by voluntarily disclosing data to investors and the
government, and the government regulates markets by mandating and
enforcing the rule of public disclosure.
Whereas the 1934 Securities Exchange Act set a high burden of proof
for private litigants to decrease private litigation as a regulatory means and
instead encourage transparency amongst financial firms, the Dodd-Frank
Act encourages litigation as a means of regulation rather than interorganizational transparency. By encouraging whistle-blowers to find and
report fraud directly to the SEC, Dodd-Frank also encourages companies to
decrease transparency in order to prevent whistle-blowers from discovering
potentially harmful information. As such, this ripple effect harms investors
seeking information about the companies in which they invest, and the
SEC’s ability to regulate the industry as a whole. Further, because
investors have less information about the companies in which they invest,
their decisions cannot act as a means of regulation. That is, their
investment in or aversion to certain companies cannot determine the market
value of those companies, and therefore market prices do not reflect the
way informed, rational consumers would value those companies in an
efficient, transparent market.
In contrast, if the barriers to litigation were higher for whistle-blowers,
firms would have greater incentive to be transparent and open with
employees, thus encouraging them to report issues internally so that they
could be resolved efficiently and effectively. Further, transparency would
increase the chances that the SEC would be privy to information about
employers, and therefore decrease employees’ opportunities to provide the
SEC with “original” information.92 Only after internal means of regulation
were exhausted should whistle-blowers turn to litigation. Transparency
and internal remedies foster a better corporate culture and sense of
confidence amongst employees and investors alike, rendering this means of
self-regulation a favorable solution.
Transparency has another important effect in self-regulation. Unlike
government agencies, sophisticated investors have a strong incentive and
ability to analyze companies to identify potential risks and problems.
Indeed, they are better equipped to access and analyze market data in real
time, and to determine which issues pose significant threats to the industry

90. Dalley, supra note 89, at 1109.
91. See id. at 1092.
92. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922.
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as a whole.93 Hedge funds and investment firms, for example, often have
entire departments dedicated to researching the companies in which they
invest.
These companies have significantly more resources than
government investigators, and can prompt other companies to address
problems by publishing reports and findings that discourage other investors
from investing in a particular company and, in turn, encourage the
company to address the problem or face real financial losses. This is
because intermediaries such as investment firms “rely on their reputation in
attracting business.”94 By effectively encouraging companies to become
less transparent, however, Dodd-Frank chips away at an important means
of regulation.
Dodd-Frank does take a step in the right direction by moving away
from the OSHA regulatory mechanisms, as used by Sarbanes-Oxley, and
instead utilizing the expertise of the SEC to investigate whistle-blower
claims. Unlike the SEC, the OSHA had little securities fraud experience
and was therefore ill-equipped to delve into the complex world of financial
markets.95 Nonetheless, the SEC simply lacks the resources to identify and
respond to all cases of financial fraud in real time, particularly when
compared to private firms and investors. Its regulatory power should
therefore be supplemented by some form of market self-regulation, such as
transparency.
VI. CURBING FALSE CLAIMS
Both the SEC and private employers will need to take deliberate steps
to curb false claims. As written, Dodd-Frank provides little disincentive
for attempting to file a meritless claim because of the huge cash rewards at
stake for a successful claim.
Employers have several options to discourage employees from
bypassing internal reporting mechanisms. First, employers can improve
internal reporting programs by adding cash bonuses. These bonuses need
not match the massive potential payouts of SEC claims because they will
offer the distinct advantage of a quick payout without the pain of protracted
litigation. In addition, employers must ensure that managers can identify
potential whistle-blower complaints to ensure either internal resolution or
self-reporting to the SEC, before the employee goes directly to the SEC.96
Further, employers can continue a practice instituted in response to
Sarbanes-Oxley, whereby many employers require employees to annually
certify that they were not aware of any wrongdoing regarding the
93. Tolar, supra note 23.
94. Gerner-Beuerle, supra note 81, at 321.
95. See Jisoo Kim, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower
Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241 (2009).
96. Tolar, supra note 23, at 7.
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employer’s finances or financial reporting.97 This practice acts as a strong
defense against false claims. Nonetheless, in light of the probable
unenforceability of arbitration and severance agreements under DoddFrank, employers must carefully craft these certifications to ensure
compliance with the rules.98
In addition, it is imperative that employers implement strict antiretaliation policies. This will help ensure that, should a whistle-blower
bring a retaliation claim, they will not be able to prove the causal nexus
element of a prima facie case of retaliation.99 It would also behoove
employers to keep records of e-mails and other documents that might
provide a lawful explanation for the alleged retaliation.100 This would
allow employers to catch cases of retaliation internally and remedy them or
report them to the SEC immediately. In addition, it would reassure
employees that retaliation claims were being taken seriously and institute a
no-tolerance policy for retaliation against employees.
Finally, the importance of creating a corporate culture that is friendly
to internal whistle-blowing should not be understated. The Enron and
WorldCom scandals, which influenced the development and passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley,101 illuminated the problems with discouraging insiders
In
from coming forward with information about misconduct.102
Congressional hearings prior to the passage of that act, for example, an
Enron whistle-blower testified about the intimidating nature of Enron
executives, as well as the hostile environment that discouraged internal
reporting.103 The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistle-blower protections
was intended in part to overcome such hostile corporate environments by
encouraging whistle-blowers to come forward.104 By ensuring that
employees feel comfortable and safe discussing their concerns internally,
however, employers can avoid the costs involved in defending against SEC
investigations spurred by whistle-blower claims. As always, any claims
that could not be resolved internally could be self-reported to the SEC.
The SEC must also work to reduce the number of false or meritless
claims, particularly by publicly sanctioning whistle-blowers and attorneys
that file claims with no objective possibility of success on the merits, to set
a clear no-tolerance policy. If Dodd-Frank itself does not provide
disincentives for meritless claims, then the SEC must demonstrate that only
serious claims will be tolerated. This could also include collaboration with

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Tolar, supra note 23, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 9.
Wiener, supra note 73, at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id.
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state bar associations to penalize attorneys who knowingly file meritless or
false claims with the SEC.
VII. CONCLUSION
As would-be whistle-blowers line up to file suits under Dodd-Frank, it
will be crucial for the SEC to set some boundaries by penalizing those who
knowingly file false claims, and by strictly adhering to the requirements
that whistle-blowers provide original information.
The original
information requirement is itself likely to preclude many claims, but should
nonetheless be publicized to ensure that meritless claims are not filed at all.
Furthermore, employers must create internal measures for employees
to report perceived frauds and violations, and would be wise to create
smaller bounties for employees who highlight real concerns within the
company. This will ensure that employees have more incentive to resolve
their concerns internally, decrease the chance that they can provide the
SEC with original information, and foster a better workplace environment.
In addition, the SEC should consider supplementing its regulatory
efforts with some form of market self-regulation. A disclosure-based
system, for example, could be an effective way to increase transparency
and foster efficient regulation.
By addressing some of the shortcomings inherent in Dodd-Frank, and
exploring alternative means of regulation, the SEC can incentivize and
regulate an efficient financial market. Particularly in the face of the recent
financial crisis, efficient regulation is all the more important, and the
government cannot afford to waste resources on defending against
unnecessary litigation. Therefore Dodd-Frank’s shortcomings with regards
to whistle-blower incentives must be addressed to allow the SEC to
regulate financial markets as the nation emerges from financial crisis into
economic recovery.

LUHRS-DODD FRANK-10-12-11.JJO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

190

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

***

10/30/2011 3:53 PM

Vol. 8:1

